This reverts commit 3370d58956ecc744a004dff47b0437473f0ef7da.
This commit was done with an LLVM build that did not have assertions
enabled. There are LLVM assertions being triggered due to this commit.
Reopens#10627Reopens#12013Reopens#12027
* allow file level `union {}` to parse as tuple field
this was found while fuzzing zls.
* before this patch the input `union {}` crashed the parser. after
this, it parses correctly just like `struct {}`.
* adds behavior tests for both inputs `struct {}` and `union {}`,
checking that each becomes a file level tuple field.
Can occur when trying to open a directory for iteration but the 'List folder contents' permission of the directory is set to 'Deny'.
This was found because it was being triggered during PATH searching in ChildProcess.spawnWindows if a PATH entry did not have 'List folder contents' permission, so this fixes that as well (note: the behavior on hitting this during PATH searching is to treat it as the directory not existing and therefore will fail to find any executables in a directory in the PATH without 'List folder contents' permission; this matches Windows behavior which also fails to find commands in directories that do not have 'List folder contents' permission).
* pthread_key_t should also be available for non-android platforms
* Also change the type to c_uint because Linux pthreadtypes.h typedefs it as "unsigned int"
Partially addresses #13950
The extended instructions starting with opcode `0xFC` are refactored
to make the work the same as the SIMD instructions. This means a
`Mir` instruction no longer contains a field 'secondary'. Instead,
we use the `payload` field to store the index into the extra list
which contains the extended opcode value. In case of instructions
such as 'memory.fill' which also have an immediate value, such
values will also be stored in the extra list right after the
instruction itself. This makes each `Mir` instruction smaller.
This reverts commit aa3964477f662ea5487aa4a1e4595d174e49a89d.
This declaration is already provided by operating-system-specific files.
This is not the correct solution to the problem.
See #14013Reopens#13950
these were found while fuzzing zls.
this patch prevents overflow for the following file contents and adds
tests for them.
* `enum(u32)` - causes overflow in std.zig.Ast.fullContainerDecl()
* `*x` - causes overflow in std.zig.Ast.fullPtrType()
* `**x` - causes overflow in std.zig.Ast.firstToken()
Fixes a regression caused by https://github.com/ziglang/zig/pull/13983
From the added comment:
We still search the path if the cwd is absolute because of the
"cwd set in ChildProcess is in effect when choosing the executable path
to match posix semantics" behavior--we don't want to skip searching
the PATH just because we were trying to set the cwd of the child process.
* Initialize `big_align` with 1 as 0 is not a valid alignment.
* Add an assert to `alignForwardGeneric` to catch this issue earlier.
* Refactor valid alignment checks to call a more descriptive function.
The name of the game here is to avoid CreateProcessW calls at all costs,
and only ever try calling it when we have a real candidate for execution.
Secondarily, we want to minimize the number of syscalls used when checking
for each PATHEXT-appended version of the app name.
An overview of the technique used:
- Open the search directory for iteration (either cwd or a path from PATH)
- Use NtQueryDirectoryFile with a wildcard filename of `<app name>*` to
check if anything that could possibly match either the unappended version
of the app name or any of the versions with a PATHEXT value appended exists.
- If the wildcard NtQueryDirectoryFile call found nothing, we can exit early
without needing to use PATHEXT at all.
This allows us to use a <open dir, NtQueryDirectoryFile, close dir> sequence
for any directory that doesn't contain any possible matches, instead of having
to use a separate look up for each individual filename combination (unappended +
each PATHEXT appended). For directories where the wildcard *does* match something,
we only need to do a maximum of <number of supported PATHEXT extensions> more
NtQueryDirectoryFile calls.
---
In addition, we now only evaluate the extensions in PATHEXT that we know we can handle (.COM, .EXE, .BAT, .CMD) and ignore the rest.
---
This commit also makes two edge cases match Windows behavior:
- If an app name has the extension .exe and it is attempted to be executed, that is now treated as unrecoverable and InvalidExe is immediately returned no matter where the .exe is (cwd or in the PATH). This matches the behavior of the Windows cmd.exe.
- If the app name contains more than just a filename (e.g. it has path separators), then it is excluded from PATH searching and only does a cwd search. This matches the behavior of Windows cmd.exe.
This was a poor naming choice; these are parameters, not arguments.
Parameters specify what kind of arguments are expected, whereas the arguments are the actual values passed.
This matches `cmd.exe` behavior. For example, if there is only a file named `mycommand` in the cwd but it is a Linux executable, then running the command `mycommand` will result in:
'mycommand' is not recognized as an internal or external command, operable program or batch file.
However, if there is *both* a `mycommand` (that is a Linux executable) and a `mycommand.exe` that is a valid Windows exe, then running the command `mycommand` will successfully run `mycommand.exe`.
Avoid a lot of unnecessary utf8 -> utf16 conversion and use a single ArrayList buffer for all the joined paths instead of a separate allocation for each join
