mirror of
https://github.com/ziglang/zig.git
synced 2025-12-06 14:23:09 +00:00
743 lines
37 KiB
Zig
743 lines
37 KiB
Zig
const std = @import("../../std.zig");
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const tls = std.crypto.tls;
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const Client = @This();
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const net = std.net;
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const mem = std.mem;
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const crypto = std.crypto;
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const assert = std.debug.assert;
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const ApplicationCipher = tls.ApplicationCipher;
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const CipherSuite = tls.CipherSuite;
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const ContentType = tls.ContentType;
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const HandshakeType = tls.HandshakeType;
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const CipherParams = tls.CipherParams;
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const max_ciphertext_len = tls.max_ciphertext_len;
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const hkdfExpandLabel = tls.hkdfExpandLabel;
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const int2 = tls.int2;
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const int3 = tls.int3;
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const array = tls.array;
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const enum_array = tls.enum_array;
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application_cipher: ApplicationCipher,
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read_seq: u64,
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write_seq: u64,
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/// The size is enough to contain exactly one TLSCiphertext record.
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partially_read_buffer: [tls.max_ciphertext_record_len]u8,
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/// The number of partially read bytes inside `partiall_read_buffer`.
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partially_read_len: u15,
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eof: bool,
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/// `host` is only borrowed during this function call.
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pub fn init(stream: net.Stream, host: []const u8) !Client {
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const host_len = @intCast(u16, host.len);
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var random_buffer: [128]u8 = undefined;
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crypto.random.bytes(&random_buffer);
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const hello_rand = random_buffer[0..32].*;
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const legacy_session_id = random_buffer[32..64].*;
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const x25519_kp_seed = random_buffer[64..96].*;
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const secp256r1_kp_seed = random_buffer[96..128].*;
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const x25519_kp = crypto.dh.X25519.KeyPair.create(x25519_kp_seed) catch |err| switch (err) {
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// Only possible to happen if the private key is all zeroes.
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error.IdentityElement => return error.InsufficientEntropy,
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};
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const secp256r1_kp = crypto.sign.ecdsa.EcdsaP256Sha256.KeyPair.create(secp256r1_kp_seed) catch |err| switch (err) {
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// Only possible to happen if the private key is all zeroes.
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error.IdentityElement => return error.InsufficientEntropy,
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};
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const extensions_payload =
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tls.extension(.supported_versions, [_]u8{
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0x02, // byte length of supported versions
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0x03, 0x04, // TLS 1.3
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}) ++ tls.extension(.signature_algorithms, enum_array(tls.SignatureScheme, &.{
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.rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
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.rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
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.rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
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.ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
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.ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
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.ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
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.rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
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.rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
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.rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
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.ed25519,
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.ed448,
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.rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
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.rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
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.rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
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.rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
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.ecdsa_sha1,
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})) ++ tls.extension(.supported_groups, enum_array(tls.NamedGroup, &.{
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.secp256r1,
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.x25519,
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})) ++ tls.extension(
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.key_share,
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array(1, int2(@enumToInt(tls.NamedGroup.x25519)) ++
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array(1, x25519_kp.public_key) ++
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int2(@enumToInt(tls.NamedGroup.secp256r1)) ++
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array(1, secp256r1_kp.public_key.toUncompressedSec1())),
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) ++
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int2(@enumToInt(tls.ExtensionType.server_name)) ++
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int2(host_len + 5) ++ // byte length of this extension payload
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int2(host_len + 3) ++ // server_name_list byte count
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[1]u8{0x00} ++ // name_type
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int2(host_len);
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const extensions_header =
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int2(@intCast(u16, extensions_payload.len + host_len)) ++
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extensions_payload;
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const legacy_compression_methods = 0x0100;
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const client_hello =
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int2(@enumToInt(tls.ProtocolVersion.tls_1_2)) ++
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hello_rand ++
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[1]u8{32} ++ legacy_session_id ++
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cipher_suites ++
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int2(legacy_compression_methods) ++
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extensions_header;
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const handshake =
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[_]u8{@enumToInt(HandshakeType.client_hello)} ++
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int3(@intCast(u24, client_hello.len + host_len)) ++
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client_hello;
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const hello_header = [_]u8{
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// Plaintext header
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@enumToInt(ContentType.handshake),
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0x03, 0x01, // legacy_record_version
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} ++
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int2(@intCast(u16, handshake.len + host_len)) ++
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handshake;
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{
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var iovecs = [_]std.os.iovec_const{
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.{
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.iov_base = &hello_header,
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.iov_len = hello_header.len,
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},
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.{
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.iov_base = host.ptr,
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.iov_len = host.len,
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},
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};
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try stream.writevAll(&iovecs);
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}
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const client_hello_bytes1 = hello_header[5..];
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var cipher_params: CipherParams = undefined;
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var handshake_buf: [8000]u8 = undefined;
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var len: usize = 0;
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var i: usize = i: {
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const plaintext = handshake_buf[0..5];
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len = try stream.readAtLeast(&handshake_buf, plaintext.len);
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if (len < plaintext.len) return error.EndOfStream;
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const ct = @intToEnum(ContentType, plaintext[0]);
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const frag_len = mem.readIntBig(u16, plaintext[3..][0..2]);
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const end = plaintext.len + frag_len;
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if (end > handshake_buf.len) return error.TlsRecordOverflow;
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if (end > len) {
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len += try stream.readAtLeast(handshake_buf[len..], end - len);
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if (end > len) return error.EndOfStream;
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}
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const frag = handshake_buf[plaintext.len..end];
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switch (ct) {
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.alert => {
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const level = @intToEnum(tls.AlertLevel, frag[0]);
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const desc = @intToEnum(tls.AlertDescription, frag[1]);
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std.debug.print("alert: {s} {s}\n", .{ @tagName(level), @tagName(desc) });
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return error.TlsAlert;
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},
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.handshake => {
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if (frag[0] != @enumToInt(HandshakeType.server_hello)) {
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return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage;
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}
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const length = mem.readIntBig(u24, frag[1..4]);
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if (4 + length != frag.len) return error.TlsBadLength;
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var i: usize = 4;
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const legacy_version = mem.readIntBig(u16, frag[i..][0..2]);
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i += 2;
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const random = frag[i..][0..32].*;
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i += 32;
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if (mem.eql(u8, &random, &tls.hello_retry_request_sequence)) {
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@panic("TODO handle HelloRetryRequest");
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}
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const legacy_session_id_echo_len = frag[i];
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i += 1;
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if (legacy_session_id_echo_len != 32) return error.TlsIllegalParameter;
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const legacy_session_id_echo = frag[i..][0..32];
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if (!mem.eql(u8, legacy_session_id_echo, &legacy_session_id))
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return error.TlsIllegalParameter;
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i += 32;
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const cipher_suite_int = mem.readIntBig(u16, frag[i..][0..2]);
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i += 2;
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const cipher_suite_tag = @intToEnum(CipherSuite, cipher_suite_int);
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std.debug.print("server wants cipher suite {any}\n", .{cipher_suite_tag});
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const legacy_compression_method = frag[i];
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i += 1;
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_ = legacy_compression_method;
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const extensions_size = mem.readIntBig(u16, frag[i..][0..2]);
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i += 2;
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if (i + extensions_size != frag.len) return error.TlsBadLength;
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var supported_version: u16 = 0;
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var shared_key: [32]u8 = undefined;
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var have_shared_key = false;
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while (i < frag.len) {
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const et = mem.readIntBig(u16, frag[i..][0..2]);
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i += 2;
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const ext_size = mem.readIntBig(u16, frag[i..][0..2]);
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i += 2;
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const next_i = i + ext_size;
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if (next_i > frag.len) return error.TlsBadLength;
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switch (et) {
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@enumToInt(tls.ExtensionType.supported_versions) => {
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if (supported_version != 0) return error.TlsIllegalParameter;
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supported_version = mem.readIntBig(u16, frag[i..][0..2]);
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},
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@enumToInt(tls.ExtensionType.key_share) => {
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if (have_shared_key) return error.TlsIllegalParameter;
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have_shared_key = true;
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const named_group = mem.readIntBig(u16, frag[i..][0..2]);
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i += 2;
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const key_size = mem.readIntBig(u16, frag[i..][0..2]);
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i += 2;
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switch (named_group) {
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@enumToInt(tls.NamedGroup.x25519) => {
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if (key_size != 32) return error.TlsBadLength;
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const server_pub_key = frag[i..][0..32];
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shared_key = crypto.dh.X25519.scalarmult(
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x25519_kp.secret_key,
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server_pub_key.*,
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) catch return error.TlsDecryptFailure;
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},
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@enumToInt(tls.NamedGroup.secp256r1) => {
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const server_pub_key = frag[i..][0..key_size];
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const PublicKey = crypto.sign.ecdsa.EcdsaP256Sha256.PublicKey;
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const pk = PublicKey.fromSec1(server_pub_key) catch {
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return error.TlsDecryptFailure;
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};
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const mul = pk.p.mulPublic(secp256r1_kp.secret_key.bytes, .Big) catch {
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return error.TlsDecryptFailure;
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};
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shared_key = mul.affineCoordinates().x.toBytes(.Big);
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},
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else => {
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std.debug.print("named group: {x}\n", .{named_group});
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return error.TlsIllegalParameter;
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},
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}
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},
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else => {
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std.debug.print("unexpected extension: {x}\n", .{et});
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},
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}
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i = next_i;
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}
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if (!have_shared_key) return error.TlsIllegalParameter;
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const tls_version = if (supported_version == 0) legacy_version else supported_version;
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switch (tls_version) {
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@enumToInt(tls.ProtocolVersion.tls_1_2) => {
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std.debug.print("server wants TLS v1.2\n", .{});
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},
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@enumToInt(tls.ProtocolVersion.tls_1_3) => {
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std.debug.print("server wants TLS v1.3\n", .{});
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},
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else => return error.TlsIllegalParameter,
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}
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switch (cipher_suite_tag) {
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inline .AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
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.AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
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.CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
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.AEGIS_256_SHA384,
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.AEGIS_128L_SHA256,
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=> |tag| {
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const P = std.meta.TagPayloadByName(CipherParams, @tagName(tag));
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cipher_params = @unionInit(CipherParams, @tagName(tag), .{
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.handshake_secret = undefined,
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.master_secret = undefined,
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.client_handshake_key = undefined,
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.server_handshake_key = undefined,
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.client_finished_key = undefined,
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.server_finished_key = undefined,
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.client_handshake_iv = undefined,
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.server_handshake_iv = undefined,
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.transcript_hash = P.Hash.init(.{}),
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.finished_digest = undefined,
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});
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const p = &@field(cipher_params, @tagName(tag));
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p.transcript_hash.update(client_hello_bytes1); // Client Hello part 1
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p.transcript_hash.update(host); // Client Hello part 2
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p.transcript_hash.update(frag); // Server Hello
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const hello_hash = p.transcript_hash.peek();
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const zeroes = [1]u8{0} ** P.Hash.digest_length;
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const early_secret = P.Hkdf.extract(&[1]u8{0}, &zeroes);
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const empty_hash = tls.emptyHash(P.Hash);
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const hs_derived_secret = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, early_secret, "derived", &empty_hash, P.Hash.digest_length);
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p.handshake_secret = P.Hkdf.extract(&hs_derived_secret, &shared_key);
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const ap_derived_secret = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, p.handshake_secret, "derived", &empty_hash, P.Hash.digest_length);
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p.master_secret = P.Hkdf.extract(&ap_derived_secret, &zeroes);
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const client_secret = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, p.handshake_secret, "c hs traffic", &hello_hash, P.Hash.digest_length);
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const server_secret = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, p.handshake_secret, "s hs traffic", &hello_hash, P.Hash.digest_length);
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p.client_finished_key = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, client_secret, "finished", "", P.Hmac.key_length);
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p.server_finished_key = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, server_secret, "finished", "", P.Hmac.key_length);
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p.client_handshake_key = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, client_secret, "key", "", P.AEAD.key_length);
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p.server_handshake_key = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, server_secret, "key", "", P.AEAD.key_length);
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p.client_handshake_iv = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, client_secret, "iv", "", P.AEAD.nonce_length);
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p.server_handshake_iv = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, server_secret, "iv", "", P.AEAD.nonce_length);
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//std.debug.print("shared_key: {}\nhello_hash: {}\nearly_secret: {}\nempty_hash: {}\nderived_secret: {}\nhandshake_secret: {}\n client_secret: {}\n server_secret: {}\nclient_handshake_iv: {}\nserver_handshake_iv: {}\n", .{
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// std.fmt.fmtSliceHexLower(&shared_key),
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// std.fmt.fmtSliceHexLower(&hello_hash),
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// std.fmt.fmtSliceHexLower(&early_secret),
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// std.fmt.fmtSliceHexLower(&empty_hash),
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// std.fmt.fmtSliceHexLower(&hs_derived_secret),
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// std.fmt.fmtSliceHexLower(&p.handshake_secret),
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// std.fmt.fmtSliceHexLower(&client_secret),
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// std.fmt.fmtSliceHexLower(&server_secret),
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// std.fmt.fmtSliceHexLower(&p.client_handshake_iv),
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// std.fmt.fmtSliceHexLower(&p.server_handshake_iv),
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//});
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},
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else => {
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return error.TlsIllegalParameter;
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},
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}
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},
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else => return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage,
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}
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break :i end;
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};
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var read_seq: u64 = 0;
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while (true) {
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const end_hdr = i + 5;
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if (end_hdr > handshake_buf.len) return error.TlsRecordOverflow;
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if (end_hdr > len) {
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len += try stream.readAtLeast(handshake_buf[len..], end_hdr - len);
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if (end_hdr > len) return error.EndOfStream;
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}
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const ct = @intToEnum(ContentType, handshake_buf[i]);
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i += 1;
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const legacy_version = mem.readIntBig(u16, handshake_buf[i..][0..2]);
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i += 2;
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_ = legacy_version;
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const record_size = mem.readIntBig(u16, handshake_buf[i..][0..2]);
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i += 2;
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const end = i + record_size;
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if (end > handshake_buf.len) return error.TlsRecordOverflow;
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if (end > len) {
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len += try stream.readAtLeast(handshake_buf[len..], end - len);
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if (end > len) return error.EndOfStream;
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}
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switch (ct) {
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.change_cipher_spec => {
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if (record_size != 1) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage;
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if (handshake_buf[i] != 0x01) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage;
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},
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.application_data => {
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var cleartext_buf: [8000]u8 = undefined;
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const cleartext = switch (cipher_params) {
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inline else => |*p| c: {
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const P = @TypeOf(p.*);
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const ciphertext_len = record_size - P.AEAD.tag_length;
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const ciphertext = handshake_buf[i..][0..ciphertext_len];
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i += ciphertext.len;
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if (ciphertext.len > cleartext_buf.len) return error.TlsRecordOverflow;
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const cleartext = cleartext_buf[0..ciphertext.len];
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const auth_tag = handshake_buf[i..][0..P.AEAD.tag_length].*;
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const V = @Vector(P.AEAD.nonce_length, u8);
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const pad = [1]u8{0} ** (P.AEAD.nonce_length - 8);
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const operand: V = pad ++ @bitCast([8]u8, big(read_seq));
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read_seq += 1;
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const nonce = @as(V, p.server_handshake_iv) ^ operand;
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const ad = handshake_buf[end_hdr - 5 ..][0..5];
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P.AEAD.decrypt(cleartext, ciphertext, auth_tag, ad, nonce, p.server_handshake_key) catch
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return error.TlsBadRecordMac;
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p.transcript_hash.update(cleartext[0 .. cleartext.len - 1]);
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break :c cleartext;
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},
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};
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const inner_ct = @intToEnum(ContentType, cleartext[cleartext.len - 1]);
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switch (inner_ct) {
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.handshake => {
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var ct_i: usize = 0;
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while (true) {
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const handshake_type = cleartext[ct_i];
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ct_i += 1;
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const handshake_len = mem.readIntBig(u24, cleartext[ct_i..][0..3]);
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ct_i += 3;
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const next_handshake_i = ct_i + handshake_len;
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if (next_handshake_i > cleartext.len - 1)
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return error.TlsBadLength;
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switch (handshake_type) {
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@enumToInt(HandshakeType.encrypted_extensions) => {
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const total_ext_size = mem.readIntBig(u16, cleartext[ct_i..][0..2]);
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ct_i += 2;
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const end_ext_i = ct_i + total_ext_size;
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while (ct_i < end_ext_i) {
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const et = mem.readIntBig(u16, cleartext[ct_i..][0..2]);
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ct_i += 2;
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const ext_size = mem.readIntBig(u16, cleartext[ct_i..][0..2]);
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ct_i += 2;
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const next_ext_i = ct_i + ext_size;
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switch (et) {
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@enumToInt(tls.ExtensionType.server_name) => {},
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else => {
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std.debug.print("encrypted extension: {any}\n", .{
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et,
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});
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},
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}
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ct_i = next_ext_i;
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}
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},
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@enumToInt(HandshakeType.certificate) => {
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std.debug.print("cool certificate bro\n", .{});
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},
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@enumToInt(HandshakeType.certificate_verify) => {
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std.debug.print("the certificate came with a fancy signature\n", .{});
|
|
switch (cipher_params) {
|
|
inline else => |*p| {
|
|
p.finished_digest = p.transcript_hash.peek();
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
@enumToInt(HandshakeType.finished) => {
|
|
// This message is to trick buggy proxies into behaving correctly.
|
|
const client_change_cipher_spec_msg = [_]u8{
|
|
@enumToInt(ContentType.change_cipher_spec),
|
|
0x03, 0x03, // legacy protocol version
|
|
0x00, 0x01, // length
|
|
0x01,
|
|
};
|
|
const app_cipher = switch (cipher_params) {
|
|
inline else => |*p, tag| c: {
|
|
const P = @TypeOf(p.*);
|
|
const expected_server_verify_data = tls.hmac(P.Hmac, &p.finished_digest, p.server_finished_key);
|
|
const actual_server_verify_data = cleartext[ct_i..][0..handshake_len];
|
|
if (!mem.eql(u8, &expected_server_verify_data, actual_server_verify_data))
|
|
return error.TlsDecryptError;
|
|
const handshake_hash = p.transcript_hash.finalResult();
|
|
const verify_data = tls.hmac(P.Hmac, &handshake_hash, p.client_finished_key);
|
|
const out_cleartext = [_]u8{
|
|
@enumToInt(HandshakeType.finished),
|
|
0, 0, verify_data.len, // length
|
|
} ++ verify_data ++ [1]u8{@enumToInt(ContentType.handshake)};
|
|
|
|
const wrapped_len = out_cleartext.len + P.AEAD.tag_length;
|
|
|
|
var finished_msg = [_]u8{
|
|
@enumToInt(ContentType.application_data),
|
|
0x03, 0x03, // legacy protocol version
|
|
0, wrapped_len, // byte length of encrypted record
|
|
} ++ ([1]u8{undefined} ** wrapped_len);
|
|
|
|
const ad = finished_msg[0..5];
|
|
const ciphertext = finished_msg[5..][0..out_cleartext.len];
|
|
const auth_tag = finished_msg[finished_msg.len - P.AEAD.tag_length ..];
|
|
const nonce = p.client_handshake_iv;
|
|
P.AEAD.encrypt(ciphertext, auth_tag, &out_cleartext, ad, nonce, p.client_handshake_key);
|
|
|
|
const both_msgs = client_change_cipher_spec_msg ++ finished_msg;
|
|
try stream.writeAll(&both_msgs);
|
|
|
|
const client_secret = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, p.master_secret, "c ap traffic", &handshake_hash, P.Hash.digest_length);
|
|
const server_secret = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, p.master_secret, "s ap traffic", &handshake_hash, P.Hash.digest_length);
|
|
//std.debug.print("master_secret={}\nclient_secret={}\nserver_secret={}\n", .{
|
|
// std.fmt.fmtSliceHexLower(&p.master_secret),
|
|
// std.fmt.fmtSliceHexLower(&client_secret),
|
|
// std.fmt.fmtSliceHexLower(&server_secret),
|
|
//});
|
|
break :c @unionInit(ApplicationCipher, @tagName(tag), .{
|
|
.client_key = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, client_secret, "key", "", P.AEAD.key_length),
|
|
.server_key = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, server_secret, "key", "", P.AEAD.key_length),
|
|
.client_iv = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, client_secret, "iv", "", P.AEAD.nonce_length),
|
|
.server_iv = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, server_secret, "iv", "", P.AEAD.nonce_length),
|
|
});
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
std.debug.print("remaining bytes: {d}\n", .{len - end});
|
|
return .{
|
|
.application_cipher = app_cipher,
|
|
.read_seq = 0,
|
|
.write_seq = 0,
|
|
.partially_read_buffer = undefined,
|
|
.partially_read_len = 0,
|
|
.eof = false,
|
|
};
|
|
},
|
|
else => {
|
|
return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage;
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
ct_i = next_handshake_i;
|
|
if (ct_i >= cleartext.len - 1) break;
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
else => {
|
|
std.debug.print("inner content type: {any}\n", .{inner_ct});
|
|
return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage;
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
else => {
|
|
std.debug.print("content type: {s}\n", .{@tagName(ct)});
|
|
return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage;
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
i = end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return error.TlsHandshakeFailure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pub fn write(c: *Client, stream: net.Stream, bytes: []const u8) !usize {
|
|
var ciphertext_buf: [tls.max_ciphertext_record_len * 4]u8 = undefined;
|
|
// Due to the trailing inner content type byte in the ciphertext, we need
|
|
// an additional buffer for storing the cleartext into before encrypting.
|
|
var cleartext_buf: [max_ciphertext_len]u8 = undefined;
|
|
var iovecs_buf: [5]std.os.iovec_const = undefined;
|
|
var ciphertext_end: usize = 0;
|
|
var iovec_end: usize = 0;
|
|
var bytes_i: usize = 0;
|
|
// How many bytes are taken up by overhead per record.
|
|
const overhead_len: usize = switch (c.application_cipher) {
|
|
inline else => |*p| l: {
|
|
const P = @TypeOf(p.*);
|
|
const V = @Vector(P.AEAD.nonce_length, u8);
|
|
const overhead_len = tls.ciphertext_record_header_len + P.AEAD.tag_length + 1;
|
|
while (true) {
|
|
const encrypted_content_len = @intCast(u16, @min(
|
|
@min(bytes.len - bytes_i, max_ciphertext_len - 1),
|
|
ciphertext_buf.len -
|
|
tls.ciphertext_record_header_len - P.AEAD.tag_length - ciphertext_end - 1,
|
|
));
|
|
if (encrypted_content_len == 0) break :l overhead_len;
|
|
|
|
mem.copy(u8, &cleartext_buf, bytes[bytes_i..][0..encrypted_content_len]);
|
|
cleartext_buf[encrypted_content_len] = @enumToInt(ContentType.application_data);
|
|
bytes_i += encrypted_content_len;
|
|
const ciphertext_len = encrypted_content_len + 1;
|
|
const cleartext = cleartext_buf[0..ciphertext_len];
|
|
|
|
const record_start = ciphertext_end;
|
|
const ad = ciphertext_buf[ciphertext_end..][0..5];
|
|
ad.* =
|
|
[_]u8{@enumToInt(ContentType.application_data)} ++
|
|
int2(@enumToInt(tls.ProtocolVersion.tls_1_2)) ++
|
|
int2(ciphertext_len + P.AEAD.tag_length);
|
|
ciphertext_end += ad.len;
|
|
const ciphertext = ciphertext_buf[ciphertext_end..][0..ciphertext_len];
|
|
ciphertext_end += ciphertext_len;
|
|
const auth_tag = ciphertext_buf[ciphertext_end..][0..P.AEAD.tag_length];
|
|
ciphertext_end += auth_tag.len;
|
|
const pad = [1]u8{0} ** (P.AEAD.nonce_length - 8);
|
|
const operand: V = pad ++ @bitCast([8]u8, big(c.write_seq));
|
|
c.write_seq += 1;
|
|
const nonce = @as(V, p.client_iv) ^ operand;
|
|
P.AEAD.encrypt(ciphertext, auth_tag, cleartext, ad, nonce, p.client_key);
|
|
//std.debug.print("seq: {d} nonce: {} client_key: {} client_iv: {} ad: {} auth_tag: {}\nserver_key: {} server_iv: {}\n", .{
|
|
// c.write_seq - 1,
|
|
// std.fmt.fmtSliceHexLower(&nonce),
|
|
// std.fmt.fmtSliceHexLower(&p.client_key),
|
|
// std.fmt.fmtSliceHexLower(&p.client_iv),
|
|
// std.fmt.fmtSliceHexLower(ad),
|
|
// std.fmt.fmtSliceHexLower(auth_tag),
|
|
// std.fmt.fmtSliceHexLower(&p.server_key),
|
|
// std.fmt.fmtSliceHexLower(&p.server_iv),
|
|
//});
|
|
|
|
const record = ciphertext_buf[record_start..ciphertext_end];
|
|
iovecs_buf[iovec_end] = .{
|
|
.iov_base = record.ptr,
|
|
.iov_len = record.len,
|
|
};
|
|
iovec_end += 1;
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
// Ideally we would call writev exactly once here, however, we must ensure
|
|
// that we don't return with a record partially written.
|
|
var i: usize = 0;
|
|
var total_amt: usize = 0;
|
|
while (true) {
|
|
var amt = try stream.writev(iovecs_buf[i..iovec_end]);
|
|
while (amt >= iovecs_buf[i].iov_len) {
|
|
const encrypted_amt = iovecs_buf[i].iov_len;
|
|
total_amt += encrypted_amt - overhead_len;
|
|
amt -= encrypted_amt;
|
|
i += 1;
|
|
// Rely on the property that iovecs delineate records, meaning that
|
|
// if amt equals zero here, we have fortunately found ourselves
|
|
// with a short read that aligns at the record boundary.
|
|
if (i >= iovec_end or amt == 0) return total_amt;
|
|
}
|
|
iovecs_buf[i].iov_base += amt;
|
|
iovecs_buf[i].iov_len -= amt;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pub fn writeAll(c: *Client, stream: net.Stream, bytes: []const u8) !void {
|
|
var index: usize = 0;
|
|
while (index < bytes.len) {
|
|
index += try c.write(stream, bytes[index..]);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Returns number of bytes that have been read, which are now populated inside
|
|
/// `buffer`. A return value of zero bytes does not necessarily mean end of
|
|
/// stream.
|
|
pub fn read(c: *Client, stream: net.Stream, buffer: []u8) !usize {
|
|
const prev_len = c.partially_read_len;
|
|
var in_buf: [max_ciphertext_len * 4]u8 = undefined;
|
|
mem.copy(u8, &in_buf, c.partially_read_buffer[0..prev_len]);
|
|
|
|
// Capacity of output buffer, in records, rounded up.
|
|
const buf_cap = (buffer.len +| (max_ciphertext_len - 1)) / max_ciphertext_len;
|
|
const wanted_read_len = buf_cap * (max_ciphertext_len + tls.ciphertext_record_header_len);
|
|
const ask_slice = in_buf[prev_len..@min(wanted_read_len, in_buf.len)];
|
|
const actual_read_len = try stream.read(ask_slice);
|
|
const frag = in_buf[0 .. prev_len + actual_read_len];
|
|
if (frag.len == 0) {
|
|
c.eof = true;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
var in: usize = 0;
|
|
var out: usize = 0;
|
|
|
|
while (true) {
|
|
if (in + tls.ciphertext_record_header_len > frag.len) {
|
|
return finishRead(c, frag, in, out);
|
|
}
|
|
const ct = @intToEnum(ContentType, frag[in]);
|
|
in += 1;
|
|
const legacy_version = mem.readIntBig(u16, frag[in..][0..2]);
|
|
in += 2;
|
|
_ = legacy_version;
|
|
const record_size = mem.readIntBig(u16, frag[in..][0..2]);
|
|
in += 2;
|
|
const end = in + record_size;
|
|
if (end > frag.len) {
|
|
if (record_size > max_ciphertext_len) return error.TlsRecordOverflow;
|
|
return finishRead(c, frag, in, out);
|
|
}
|
|
switch (ct) {
|
|
.alert => {
|
|
@panic("TODO handle an alert here");
|
|
},
|
|
.application_data => {
|
|
const cleartext_len = switch (c.application_cipher) {
|
|
inline else => |*p| c: {
|
|
const P = @TypeOf(p.*);
|
|
const V = @Vector(P.AEAD.nonce_length, u8);
|
|
const ad = frag[in - 5 ..][0..5];
|
|
const ciphertext_len = record_size - P.AEAD.tag_length;
|
|
const ciphertext = frag[in..][0..ciphertext_len];
|
|
in += ciphertext_len;
|
|
const auth_tag = frag[in..][0..P.AEAD.tag_length].*;
|
|
const cleartext = buffer[out..][0..ciphertext_len];
|
|
const pad = [1]u8{0} ** (P.AEAD.nonce_length - 8);
|
|
const operand: V = pad ++ @bitCast([8]u8, big(c.read_seq));
|
|
c.read_seq += 1;
|
|
const nonce: [P.AEAD.nonce_length]u8 = @as(V, p.server_iv) ^ operand;
|
|
//std.debug.print("seq: {d} nonce: {} server_key: {} server_iv: {}\n", .{
|
|
// c.read_seq - 1,
|
|
// std.fmt.fmtSliceHexLower(&nonce),
|
|
// std.fmt.fmtSliceHexLower(&p.server_key),
|
|
// std.fmt.fmtSliceHexLower(&p.server_iv),
|
|
//});
|
|
P.AEAD.decrypt(cleartext, ciphertext, auth_tag, ad, nonce, p.server_key) catch
|
|
return error.TlsBadRecordMac;
|
|
break :c cleartext.len;
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const inner_ct = @intToEnum(ContentType, buffer[out + cleartext_len - 1]);
|
|
switch (inner_ct) {
|
|
.alert => {
|
|
const level = @intToEnum(tls.AlertLevel, buffer[out]);
|
|
const desc = @intToEnum(tls.AlertDescription, buffer[out + 1]);
|
|
if (desc == .close_notify) {
|
|
c.eof = true;
|
|
return out;
|
|
}
|
|
std.debug.print("alert: {s} {s}\n", .{ @tagName(level), @tagName(desc) });
|
|
return error.TlsAlert;
|
|
},
|
|
.handshake => {
|
|
std.debug.print("the server wants to keep shaking hands\n", .{});
|
|
},
|
|
.application_data => {
|
|
out += cleartext_len - 1;
|
|
},
|
|
else => {
|
|
std.debug.print("inner content type: {d}\n", .{inner_ct});
|
|
return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage;
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
else => {
|
|
std.debug.print("unexpected ct: {any}\n", .{ct});
|
|
return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage;
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
in = end;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn finishRead(c: *Client, frag: []const u8, in: usize, out: usize) usize {
|
|
const saved_buf = frag[in..];
|
|
mem.copy(u8, &c.partially_read_buffer, saved_buf);
|
|
c.partially_read_len = @intCast(u15, saved_buf.len);
|
|
return out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const builtin = @import("builtin");
|
|
const native_endian = builtin.cpu.arch.endian();
|
|
|
|
inline fn big(x: anytype) @TypeOf(x) {
|
|
return switch (native_endian) {
|
|
.Big => x,
|
|
.Little => @byteSwap(x),
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// The priority order here is chosen based on what crypto algorithms Zig has
|
|
/// available in the standard library as well as what is faster. Following are
|
|
/// a few data points on the relative performance of these algorithms.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Measurement taken with 0.11.0-dev.810+c2f5848fe
|
|
/// on x86_64-linux Intel(R) Core(TM) i9-9980HK CPU @ 2.40GHz:
|
|
/// zig run .lib/std/crypto/benchmark.zig -OReleaseFast
|
|
/// aegis-128l: 15382 MiB/s
|
|
/// aegis-256: 9553 MiB/s
|
|
/// aes128-gcm: 3721 MiB/s
|
|
/// aes256-gcm: 3010 MiB/s
|
|
/// chacha20Poly1305: 597 MiB/s
|
|
///
|
|
/// Measurement taken with 0.11.0-dev.810+c2f5848fe
|
|
/// on x86_64-linux Intel(R) Core(TM) i9-9980HK CPU @ 2.40GHz:
|
|
/// zig run .lib/std/crypto/benchmark.zig -OReleaseFast -mcpu=baseline
|
|
/// aegis-128l: 629 MiB/s
|
|
/// chacha20Poly1305: 529 MiB/s
|
|
/// aegis-256: 461 MiB/s
|
|
/// aes128-gcm: 138 MiB/s
|
|
/// aes256-gcm: 120 MiB/s
|
|
const cipher_suites = enum_array(tls.CipherSuite, &.{
|
|
.AEGIS_128L_SHA256,
|
|
.AEGIS_256_SHA384,
|
|
.AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
|
|
.AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
|
|
.CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
|
|
});
|