zig/lib/std/crypto/tls.zig
Andrew Kelley 611a1fdd6d std.crypto.tls: add API for sending close_notify
This commit adds `writeEnd` and `writeAllEnd` in order to send data and
also notify the server that there will be no more data written.

Unfortunately, it seems most TLS implementations in the wild get this
wrong and immediately close the socket when they see a close_notify,
rather than only ending the data stream on the application layer.
2023-01-02 16:57:16 -07:00

495 lines
15 KiB
Zig

//! Plaintext:
//! * type: ContentType
//! * legacy_record_version: u16 = 0x0303,
//! * length: u16,
//! - The length (in bytes) of the following TLSPlaintext.fragment. The
//! length MUST NOT exceed 2^14 bytes.
//! * fragment: opaque
//! - the data being transmitted
//!
//! Ciphertext
//! * ContentType opaque_type = application_data; /* 23 */
//! * ProtocolVersion legacy_record_version = 0x0303; /* TLS v1.2 */
//! * uint16 length;
//! * opaque encrypted_record[TLSCiphertext.length];
//!
//! Handshake:
//! * type: HandshakeType
//! * length: u24
//! * data: opaque
//!
//! ServerHello:
//! * ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303;
//! * Random random;
//! * opaque legacy_session_id_echo<0..32>;
//! * CipherSuite cipher_suite;
//! * uint8 legacy_compression_method = 0;
//! * Extension extensions<6..2^16-1>;
//!
//! Extension:
//! * ExtensionType extension_type;
//! * opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>;
const std = @import("../std.zig");
const Tls = @This();
const net = std.net;
const mem = std.mem;
const crypto = std.crypto;
const assert = std.debug.assert;
pub const Client = @import("tls/Client.zig");
pub const record_header_len = 5;
pub const max_ciphertext_len = (1 << 14) + 256;
pub const max_ciphertext_record_len = max_ciphertext_len + record_header_len;
pub const hello_retry_request_sequence = [32]u8{
0xCF, 0x21, 0xAD, 0x74, 0xE5, 0x9A, 0x61, 0x11, 0xBE, 0x1D, 0x8C, 0x02, 0x1E, 0x65, 0xB8, 0x91,
0xC2, 0xA2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7A, 0xBB, 0x8C, 0x5E, 0x07, 0x9E, 0x09, 0xE2, 0xC8, 0xA8, 0x33, 0x9C,
};
pub const close_notify_alert = [_]u8{
@enumToInt(AlertLevel.warning),
@enumToInt(AlertDescription.close_notify),
};
pub const ProtocolVersion = enum(u16) {
tls_1_2 = 0x0303,
tls_1_3 = 0x0304,
_,
};
pub const ContentType = enum(u8) {
invalid = 0,
change_cipher_spec = 20,
alert = 21,
handshake = 22,
application_data = 23,
_,
};
pub const HandshakeType = enum(u8) {
client_hello = 1,
server_hello = 2,
new_session_ticket = 4,
end_of_early_data = 5,
encrypted_extensions = 8,
certificate = 11,
certificate_request = 13,
certificate_verify = 15,
finished = 20,
key_update = 24,
message_hash = 254,
_,
};
pub const ExtensionType = enum(u16) {
/// RFC 6066
server_name = 0,
/// RFC 6066
max_fragment_length = 1,
/// RFC 6066
status_request = 5,
/// RFC 8422, 7919
supported_groups = 10,
/// RFC 8446
signature_algorithms = 13,
/// RFC 5764
use_srtp = 14,
/// RFC 6520
heartbeat = 15,
/// RFC 7301
application_layer_protocol_negotiation = 16,
/// RFC 6962
signed_certificate_timestamp = 18,
/// RFC 7250
client_certificate_type = 19,
/// RFC 7250
server_certificate_type = 20,
/// RFC 7685
padding = 21,
/// RFC 8446
pre_shared_key = 41,
/// RFC 8446
early_data = 42,
/// RFC 8446
supported_versions = 43,
/// RFC 8446
cookie = 44,
/// RFC 8446
psk_key_exchange_modes = 45,
/// RFC 8446
certificate_authorities = 47,
/// RFC 8446
oid_filters = 48,
/// RFC 8446
post_handshake_auth = 49,
/// RFC 8446
signature_algorithms_cert = 50,
/// RFC 8446
key_share = 51,
_,
};
pub const AlertLevel = enum(u8) {
warning = 1,
fatal = 2,
_,
};
pub const AlertDescription = enum(u8) {
close_notify = 0,
unexpected_message = 10,
bad_record_mac = 20,
record_overflow = 22,
handshake_failure = 40,
bad_certificate = 42,
unsupported_certificate = 43,
certificate_revoked = 44,
certificate_expired = 45,
certificate_unknown = 46,
illegal_parameter = 47,
unknown_ca = 48,
access_denied = 49,
decode_error = 50,
decrypt_error = 51,
protocol_version = 70,
insufficient_security = 71,
internal_error = 80,
inappropriate_fallback = 86,
user_canceled = 90,
missing_extension = 109,
unsupported_extension = 110,
unrecognized_name = 112,
bad_certificate_status_response = 113,
unknown_psk_identity = 115,
certificate_required = 116,
no_application_protocol = 120,
_,
};
pub const SignatureScheme = enum(u16) {
// RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithms
rsa_pkcs1_sha256 = 0x0401,
rsa_pkcs1_sha384 = 0x0501,
rsa_pkcs1_sha512 = 0x0601,
// ECDSA algorithms
ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 = 0x0403,
ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 = 0x0503,
ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 = 0x0603,
// RSASSA-PSS algorithms with public key OID rsaEncryption
rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 = 0x0804,
rsa_pss_rsae_sha384 = 0x0805,
rsa_pss_rsae_sha512 = 0x0806,
// EdDSA algorithms
ed25519 = 0x0807,
ed448 = 0x0808,
// RSASSA-PSS algorithms with public key OID RSASSA-PSS
rsa_pss_pss_sha256 = 0x0809,
rsa_pss_pss_sha384 = 0x080a,
rsa_pss_pss_sha512 = 0x080b,
// Legacy algorithms
rsa_pkcs1_sha1 = 0x0201,
ecdsa_sha1 = 0x0203,
_,
};
pub const NamedGroup = enum(u16) {
// Elliptic Curve Groups (ECDHE)
secp256r1 = 0x0017,
secp384r1 = 0x0018,
secp521r1 = 0x0019,
x25519 = 0x001D,
x448 = 0x001E,
// Finite Field Groups (DHE)
ffdhe2048 = 0x0100,
ffdhe3072 = 0x0101,
ffdhe4096 = 0x0102,
ffdhe6144 = 0x0103,
ffdhe8192 = 0x0104,
_,
};
pub const CipherSuite = enum(u16) {
AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = 0x1301,
AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = 0x1302,
CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 = 0x1303,
AES_128_CCM_SHA256 = 0x1304,
AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 = 0x1305,
AEGIS_256_SHA384 = 0x1306,
AEGIS_128L_SHA256 = 0x1307,
_,
};
pub const CertificateType = enum(u8) {
X509 = 0,
RawPublicKey = 2,
_,
};
pub const KeyUpdateRequest = enum(u8) {
update_not_requested = 0,
update_requested = 1,
_,
};
pub fn HandshakeCipherT(comptime AeadType: type, comptime HashType: type) type {
return struct {
pub const AEAD = AeadType;
pub const Hash = HashType;
pub const Hmac = crypto.auth.hmac.Hmac(Hash);
pub const Hkdf = crypto.kdf.hkdf.Hkdf(Hmac);
handshake_secret: [Hkdf.prk_length]u8,
master_secret: [Hkdf.prk_length]u8,
client_handshake_key: [AEAD.key_length]u8,
server_handshake_key: [AEAD.key_length]u8,
client_finished_key: [Hmac.key_length]u8,
server_finished_key: [Hmac.key_length]u8,
client_handshake_iv: [AEAD.nonce_length]u8,
server_handshake_iv: [AEAD.nonce_length]u8,
transcript_hash: Hash,
};
}
pub const HandshakeCipher = union(enum) {
AES_128_GCM_SHA256: HandshakeCipherT(crypto.aead.aes_gcm.Aes128Gcm, crypto.hash.sha2.Sha256),
AES_256_GCM_SHA384: HandshakeCipherT(crypto.aead.aes_gcm.Aes256Gcm, crypto.hash.sha2.Sha384),
CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: HandshakeCipherT(crypto.aead.chacha_poly.ChaCha20Poly1305, crypto.hash.sha2.Sha256),
AEGIS_256_SHA384: HandshakeCipherT(crypto.aead.aegis.Aegis256, crypto.hash.sha2.Sha384),
AEGIS_128L_SHA256: HandshakeCipherT(crypto.aead.aegis.Aegis128L, crypto.hash.sha2.Sha256),
};
pub fn ApplicationCipherT(comptime AeadType: type, comptime HashType: type) type {
return struct {
pub const AEAD = AeadType;
pub const Hash = HashType;
pub const Hmac = crypto.auth.hmac.Hmac(Hash);
pub const Hkdf = crypto.kdf.hkdf.Hkdf(Hmac);
client_secret: [Hash.digest_length]u8,
server_secret: [Hash.digest_length]u8,
client_key: [AEAD.key_length]u8,
server_key: [AEAD.key_length]u8,
client_iv: [AEAD.nonce_length]u8,
server_iv: [AEAD.nonce_length]u8,
};
}
/// Encryption parameters for application traffic.
pub const ApplicationCipher = union(enum) {
AES_128_GCM_SHA256: ApplicationCipherT(crypto.aead.aes_gcm.Aes128Gcm, crypto.hash.sha2.Sha256),
AES_256_GCM_SHA384: ApplicationCipherT(crypto.aead.aes_gcm.Aes256Gcm, crypto.hash.sha2.Sha384),
CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: ApplicationCipherT(crypto.aead.chacha_poly.ChaCha20Poly1305, crypto.hash.sha2.Sha256),
AEGIS_256_SHA384: ApplicationCipherT(crypto.aead.aegis.Aegis256, crypto.hash.sha2.Sha384),
AEGIS_128L_SHA256: ApplicationCipherT(crypto.aead.aegis.Aegis128L, crypto.hash.sha2.Sha256),
};
pub fn hkdfExpandLabel(
comptime Hkdf: type,
key: [Hkdf.prk_length]u8,
label: []const u8,
context: []const u8,
comptime len: usize,
) [len]u8 {
const max_label_len = 255;
const max_context_len = 255;
const tls13 = "tls13 ";
var buf: [2 + 1 + tls13.len + max_label_len + 1 + max_context_len]u8 = undefined;
mem.writeIntBig(u16, buf[0..2], len);
buf[2] = @intCast(u8, tls13.len + label.len);
buf[3..][0..tls13.len].* = tls13.*;
var i: usize = 3 + tls13.len;
mem.copy(u8, buf[i..], label);
i += label.len;
buf[i] = @intCast(u8, context.len);
i += 1;
mem.copy(u8, buf[i..], context);
i += context.len;
var result: [len]u8 = undefined;
Hkdf.expand(&result, buf[0..i], key);
return result;
}
pub fn emptyHash(comptime Hash: type) [Hash.digest_length]u8 {
var result: [Hash.digest_length]u8 = undefined;
Hash.hash(&.{}, &result, .{});
return result;
}
pub fn hmac(comptime Hmac: type, message: []const u8, key: [Hmac.key_length]u8) [Hmac.mac_length]u8 {
var result: [Hmac.mac_length]u8 = undefined;
Hmac.create(&result, message, &key);
return result;
}
pub inline fn extension(comptime et: ExtensionType, bytes: anytype) [2 + 2 + bytes.len]u8 {
return int2(@enumToInt(et)) ++ array(1, bytes);
}
pub inline fn array(comptime elem_size: comptime_int, bytes: anytype) [2 + bytes.len]u8 {
comptime assert(bytes.len % elem_size == 0);
return int2(bytes.len) ++ bytes;
}
pub inline fn enum_array(comptime E: type, comptime tags: []const E) [2 + @sizeOf(E) * tags.len]u8 {
assert(@sizeOf(E) == 2);
var result: [tags.len * 2]u8 = undefined;
for (tags) |elem, i| {
result[i * 2] = @truncate(u8, @enumToInt(elem) >> 8);
result[i * 2 + 1] = @truncate(u8, @enumToInt(elem));
}
return array(2, result);
}
pub inline fn int2(x: u16) [2]u8 {
return .{
@truncate(u8, x >> 8),
@truncate(u8, x),
};
}
pub inline fn int3(x: u24) [3]u8 {
return .{
@truncate(u8, x >> 16),
@truncate(u8, x >> 8),
@truncate(u8, x),
};
}
/// An abstraction to ensure that protocol-parsing code does not perform an
/// out-of-bounds read.
pub const Decoder = struct {
buf: []u8,
/// Points to the next byte in buffer that will be decoded.
idx: usize = 0,
/// Up to this point in `buf` we have already checked that `cap` is greater than it.
our_end: usize = 0,
/// Beyond this point in `buf` is extra tag-along bytes beyond the amount we
/// requested with `readAtLeast`.
their_end: usize = 0,
/// Points to the end within buffer that has been filled. Beyond this point
/// in buf is undefined bytes.
cap: usize = 0,
/// Debug helper to prevent illegal calls to read functions.
disable_reads: bool = false,
pub fn fromTheirSlice(buf: []u8) Decoder {
return .{
.buf = buf,
.their_end = buf.len,
.cap = buf.len,
.disable_reads = true,
};
}
/// Use this function to increase `their_end`.
pub fn readAtLeast(d: *Decoder, stream: anytype, their_amt: usize) !void {
assert(!d.disable_reads);
const existing_amt = d.cap - d.idx;
d.their_end = d.idx + their_amt;
if (their_amt <= existing_amt) return;
const request_amt = their_amt - existing_amt;
const dest = d.buf[d.cap..];
if (request_amt > dest.len) return error.TlsRecordOverflow;
const actual_amt = try stream.readAtLeast(dest, request_amt);
if (actual_amt < request_amt) return error.TlsConnectionTruncated;
d.cap += actual_amt;
}
/// Same as `readAtLeast` but also increases `our_end` by exactly `our_amt`.
/// Use when `our_amt` is calculated by us, not by them.
pub fn readAtLeastOurAmt(d: *Decoder, stream: anytype, our_amt: usize) !void {
assert(!d.disable_reads);
try readAtLeast(d, stream, our_amt);
d.our_end = d.idx + our_amt;
}
/// Use this function to increase `our_end`.
/// This should always be called with an amount provided by us, not them.
pub fn ensure(d: *Decoder, amt: usize) !void {
d.our_end = @max(d.idx + amt, d.our_end);
if (d.our_end > d.their_end) return error.TlsDecodeError;
}
/// Use this function to increase `idx`.
pub fn decode(d: *Decoder, comptime T: type) T {
switch (@typeInfo(T)) {
.Int => |info| switch (info.bits) {
8 => {
skip(d, 1);
return d.buf[d.idx - 1];
},
16 => {
skip(d, 2);
const b0: u16 = d.buf[d.idx - 2];
const b1: u16 = d.buf[d.idx - 1];
return (b0 << 8) | b1;
},
24 => {
skip(d, 3);
const b0: u24 = d.buf[d.idx - 3];
const b1: u24 = d.buf[d.idx - 2];
const b2: u24 = d.buf[d.idx - 1];
return (b0 << 16) | (b1 << 8) | b2;
},
else => @compileError("unsupported int type: " ++ @typeName(T)),
},
.Enum => |info| {
const int = d.decode(info.tag_type);
if (info.is_exhaustive) @compileError("exhaustive enum cannot be used");
return @intToEnum(T, int);
},
else => @compileError("unsupported type: " ++ @typeName(T)),
}
}
/// Use this function to increase `idx`.
pub fn array(d: *Decoder, comptime len: usize) *[len]u8 {
skip(d, len);
return d.buf[d.idx - len ..][0..len];
}
/// Use this function to increase `idx`.
pub fn slice(d: *Decoder, len: usize) []u8 {
skip(d, len);
return d.buf[d.idx - len ..][0..len];
}
/// Use this function to increase `idx`.
pub fn skip(d: *Decoder, amt: usize) void {
d.idx += amt;
assert(d.idx <= d.our_end); // insufficient ensured bytes
}
pub fn eof(d: Decoder) bool {
assert(d.our_end <= d.their_end);
assert(d.idx <= d.our_end);
return d.idx == d.their_end;
}
/// Provide the length they claim, and receive a sub-decoder specific to that slice.
/// The parent decoder is advanced to the end.
pub fn sub(d: *Decoder, their_len: usize) !Decoder {
const end = d.idx + their_len;
if (end > d.their_end) return error.TlsDecodeError;
const sub_buf = d.buf[d.idx..end];
d.idx = end;
d.our_end = end;
return fromTheirSlice(sub_buf);
}
pub fn rest(d: Decoder) []u8 {
return d.buf[d.idx..d.cap];
}
};