C compiler intrinsics can only appear as part of a function call. When called
they are implicitly cast to a function pointer; treat this as a non-null
pointer so that it emits as a regular Zig function call.
Put `pub usingnamespace @import("std").c.builtins;` at the top of translated
C files so that they will have access to builtin functions defined there.
Fixes#6707
We generally get away with atomic primitives, however a lock is required
around the refresh function since it traverses the Node graph, and we
need to be sure no references to Nodes remain after end() is called.
Don't use the instantiation argument types to build the function
parameter array.
f416535768fc30195cad6cd481f73fd1e80082aa worked around the problem, this
commit solves it.
Everybody gets what they want!
* AT_RANDOM is completely ignored.
* On Linux, MADV_WIPEONFORK is used to provide fork safety.
* On pthread systems, `pthread_atfork` is used to provide fork safety.
* For systems that do not have the capability to provide fork safety,
the implementation falls back to calling getrandom() every time.
* If madvise is unavailable or returns an error, or pthread_atfork
fails for whatever reason, it falls back to calling getrandom() every
time.
* Applications may choose to opt-out of fork safety.
* Applications may choose to opt-in to unconditionally calling
getrandom() for every call to std.crypto.random.fillFn.
* Added `std.meta.globalOption`.
* Added `std.os.madvise` and related bits.
* Bumped up the size of the main thread TLS buffer. See the comment
there for justification.
* Simpler hot path in TLS initialization.
* get rid of the pointless fences
* make seed_len 16 instead of 32, which is accurate since it was
already padding the rest anyway; now we do 1 pad instead of 2.
* secureZero to clear the AT_RANDOM auxval
* add a flag root source files can use to disable the start code. This
is in case people want to opt out of the initialization when they
don't depend on it.
std.crypto.random
* cross platform, even freestanding
* can't fail. on initialization for some systems requires calling
os.getrandom(), in which case there are rare but theoretically
possible errors. The code panics in these cases, however the
application may choose to override the default seed function and then
handle the failure another way.
* thread-safe
* supports the full Random interface
* cryptographically secure
* no syscall required to initialize on Linux (AT_RANDOM)
* calls arc4random on systems that support it
`std.crypto.randomBytes` is removed in favor of `std.crypto.random.bytes`.
I moved some of the Random implementations into their own files in the
interest of organization.
stage2 no longer requires passing a RNG; instead it uses this API.
Closes#6704
ad05509 introduced a fix for the wrong problem, the logic to align the
start of main_thread_tls_buffer was already there but was flawed.
Fix it for good and avoid wasting too many bytes for alignment purposes.
auto_hash must be extra careful when hashing integers whose bit size is
not a multiple of 8 as, when reinterpreted with mem.asBytes, may contain
undefined non-zero bits too.
- addrinfo: addr and canonname are switched (wrong layout)
- addrinfo, Flock, msghdr struct: use proper c_xxx type instead of fixed size. it should help using struct on all architectures supported by openbsd
Xnu's sigaction() only supports fetching a limited set of sa_flags, test
SA_SIGINFO instead of SA_RESETHAND as that's supported everywhere.
Add another check to make sure SA_RESETHAND works.
Co-authored-by: Jakub Konka <kubkon@jakubkonka.com>
