This approach is more inline with what LLVM/LLD does for testing
of their output, and seems to be more generic and easier to extend
than implementing a lot of repetitive and nontrivial comparison
logic when working directly on structures.
CheckMachOStep specialises CheckFileStep into directed (surgical)
MachO file fuzzy searches. This will be the building block for
comprehensive MachO linker tests.
ECDSA is the most commonly used signature scheme today, mainly for
historical and conformance reasons. It is a necessary evil for
many standard protocols such as TLS and JWT.
It is tricky to implement securely and has been the root cause of
multiple security disasters, from the Playstation 3 hack to multiple
critical issues in OpenSSL and Java.
This implementation combines lessons learned from the past with
recent recommendations.
In Zig, the NIST curves that ECDSA is almost always instantied with
use formally verified field arithmetic, giving us peace of mind
even on edge cases. And the API rejects neutral elements where it
matters, and unconditionally checks for non-canonical encoding for
scalars and group elements. This automatically eliminates common
vulnerabilities such as https://sk.tl/2LpS695v .
ECDSA's security heavily relies on the security of the random number
generator, which is a concern in some environments.
This implementation mitigates this by computing deterministic
nonces using the conservative scheme from Pornin et al. with the
optional addition of randomness as proposed in Ericsson's
"Deterministic ECDSA and EdDSA Signatures with Additional Randomness"
document. This approach mitigates both the implications of a weak RNG
and the practical implications of fault attacks.
Project Wycheproof is a Google project to test crypto libraries against
known attacks by triggering edge cases. It discovered vulnerabilities
in virtually all major ECDSA implementations.
The entire set of ECDSA-P256-SHA256 test vectors from Project Wycheproof
is included here. Zero defects were found in this implementation.
The public API differs from the Ed25519 one. Instead of raw byte strings
for keys and signatures, we introduce Signature, PublicKey and SecretKey
structures.
The reason is that a raw byte representation would not be optimal.
There are multiple standard representations for keys and signatures,
and decoding/encoding them may not be cheap (field elements have to be
converted from/to the montgomery domain).
So, the intent is to eventually move ed25519 to the same API, which
is not going to introduce any performance regression, but will bring
us a consistent API, that we can also reuse for RSA.
And use it to debug a LazySrcLoc in stage2 that is set to a bogus value.
The actual fix in this commit is:
```diff
- try sema.emitBackwardBranch(&child_block, call_src);
+ try sema.emitBackwardBranch(block, call_src);
```
Since Zig provides @clz and not @ffs (find-first-set), log2 for comptime
integers needs to be computed algorithmically. To avoid hitting the
backward branch quota, this updates log2(x) to use a simple O(log N)
algorithm.
alongside the typical msghdr struct, Zig has added a msghdr_const
type that can be used with sendmsg which allows const data to
be provided. I believe that data pointed to by the iov and control
fields in msghdr are also left unmodified, in which case they can
be marked const as well.
* move global into function scope
* clarify comments
* avoid unnecessary usage of std.atomic API
* switch on error instead of `catch unreachable`
* call linux.gettid() instead of going through higher level API and
doing unnecessary casting
* Document deviation from Linux man page, which is identical to musl.
Man page wants always enabled user-provided abort handlers.
Worst case logic bug, which this can introduce:
+ user disables SIGABRT handler to prevent tear down to last safe
state
+ abort() gets called and enables user-provided SIGABRT handler
+ SIGABRT tears down to supposed last safe state instead of crash
+ Application, instead of crashing, continues
* Pid 1 within containers needs special handling.
- fatal signals are not transmitted without privileges,
so use exit as fallback
* Fix some signaling bits
* Add checks in Debug and ReleaseSafe for wrong sigprocmask
After P-256, here comes P-384, also known as secp384r1.
Like P-256, it is required for TLS, and is the current NIST recommendation for key exchange and signatures, for better or for worse.
Like P-256, all the finite field arithmetic has been computed and verified to be correct by fiat-crypto.
