diff --git a/lib/std/os/linux.zig b/lib/std/os/linux.zig
index fe0b71b570..cae0365863 100644
--- a/lib/std/os/linux.zig
+++ b/lib/std/os/linux.zig
@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ pub const tls = @import("linux/tls.zig");
 pub const pie = @import("linux/start_pie.zig");
 pub const BPF = @import("linux/bpf.zig");
 pub const IOCTL = @import("linux/ioctl.zig");
+pub const SECCOMP = @import("linux/seccomp.zig");
 
 pub const MAP = struct {
     pub usingnamespace arch_bits.MAP;
@@ -1667,6 +1668,10 @@ pub fn perf_event_open(
     );
 }
 
+pub fn seccomp(operation: u32, flags: u32, args: ?*const anyopaque) usize {
+    return syscall3(.seccomp, operation, flags, @ptrToInt(args));
+}
+
 pub const E = switch (native_arch) {
     .mips, .mipsel => @import("linux/errno/mips.zig").E,
     .sparc, .sparcel, .sparcv9 => @import("linux/errno/sparc.zig").E,
diff --git a/lib/std/os/linux/seccomp.zig b/lib/std/os/linux/seccomp.zig
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fd002e7416
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/std/os/linux/seccomp.zig
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+//! API bits for the Secure Computing facility in the Linux kernel, which allows
+//! processes to restrict access to the system call API.
+//!
+//! Seccomp started life with a single "strict" mode, which only allowed calls
+//! to read(2), write(2), _exit(2) and sigreturn(2). It turns out that this
+//! isn't that useful for general-purpose applications, and so a mode that
+//! utilizes user-supplied filters mode was added.
+//!
+//! Seccomp filters are classic BPF programs, which means that all the
+//! information under `std.x.net.bpf` applies here as well. Conceptually, a
+//! seccomp program is attached to the kernel and is executed on each syscall.
+//! The "packet" being validated is the `data` structure, and the verdict is an
+//! action that the kernel performs on the calling process. The actions are
+//! variations on a "pass" or "fail" result, where a pass allows the syscall to
+//! continue and a fail blocks the syscall and returns some sort of error value.
+//! See the full list of actions under ::RET for more information. Finally, only
+//! word-sized, absolute loads (`ld [k]`) are supported to read from the `data`
+//! structure.
+//!
+//! There are some issues with the filter API that have traditionally made
+//! writing them a pain:
+//!
+//! 1. Each CPU architecture supported by Linux has its own unique ABI and
+//!    syscall API. It is not guaranteed that the syscall numbers and arguments
+//!    are the same across architectures, or that they're even implemted. Thus,
+//!    filters cannot be assumed to be portable without consulting documentation
+//!    like syscalls(2) and testing on target hardware. This also requires
+//!    checking the value of `data.arch` to make sure that a filter was compiled
+//!    for the correct architecture.
+//! 2. Many syscalls take an `unsigned long` or `size_t` argument, the size of
+//!    which is dependant on the ABI. Since BPF programs execute in a 32-bit
+//!    machine, validation of 64-bit arguments necessitates two load-and-compare
+//!    instructions for the upper and lower words.
+//! 3. A further wrinkle to the above is endianess. Unlike network packets,
+//!    syscall data shares the endianess of the target machine. A filter
+//!    compiled on a little-endian machine will not work on a big-endian one,
+//!    and vice-versa. For example: Checking the upper 32-bits of `data.arg1`
+//!    requires a load at `@offsetOf(data, "arg1") + 4` on big-endian systems
+//!    and `@offsetOf(data, "arg1")` on little-endian systems. Endian-portable
+//!    filters require adjusting these offsets at compile time, similar to how
+//!    e.g. OpenSSH does[1].
+//! 4. Syscalls with userspace implementations via the vDSO cannot be traced or
+//!    filtered. The vDSO can be disabled or just ignored, which must be taken
+//!    into account when writing filters.
+//! 5. Software libraries -  especially dynamically loaded ones - tend to use
+//!    more of the syscall API over time, thus filters must evolve with them.
+//!    Static filters can result in reduced or even broken functionality when
+//!    calling newer code from these libraries. This is known to happen with
+//!    critical libraries like glibc[2].
+//!
+//! Some of these issues can be mitigated with help from Zig and the standard
+//! library. Since the target CPU is known at compile time, the proper syscall
+//! numbers are mixed into the `os` namespace under `std.os.SYS (see the code
+//! for `arch_bits` in `os/linux.zig`). Referencing an unimplemented syscall
+//! would be a compile error. Endian offsets can also be defined in a similar
+//! manner to the OpenSSH example:
+//!
+//! ```zig
+//! const offset = if (native_endian == .Little) struct {
+//!     pub const low = 0;
+//!     pub const high = @sizeOf(u32);
+//! } else struct {
+//!     pub const low = @sizeOf(u32);
+//!     pub const high = 0;
+//! };
+//! ```
+//!
+//! Unfortunately, there is no easy solution for issue 5. The most reliable
+//! strategy is to keep testing; test newer Zig versions, different libcs,
+//! different distros, and design your filter to accomidate all of them.
+//! Alternatively, you could inject a filter at runtime. Since filters are
+//! preserved across execve(2), a filter could be setup before executing your
+//! program, without your program having any knowledge of this happening. This
+//! is the method used by systemd[3] and Cloudflare's sandbox library[4].
+//!
+//! [1]: https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/master/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c#L81
+//! [2]: https://sourceware.org/legacy-ml/libc-alpha/2017-11/msg00246.html
+//! [3]: https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.exec.html#SystemCallFilter=
+//! [4]: https://github.com/cloudflare/sandbox
+//!
+//! See Also
+//! - seccomp(2), seccomp_unotify(2)
+//! - https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.html
+const IOCTL = @import("ioctl.zig");
+
+// Modes for the prctl(2) form `prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, mode)`
+pub const MODE = struct {
+    /// Seccomp not in use.
+    pub const DISABLED = 0;
+    /// Uses a hard-coded filter.
+    pub const STRICT = 1;
+    /// Uses a user-supplied filter.
+    pub const FILTER = 2;
+};
+
+// Operations for the seccomp(2) form `seccomp(operation, flags, args)`
+pub const SET_MODE_STRICT = 0;
+pub const SET_MODE_FILTER = 1;
+pub const GET_ACTION_AVAIL = 2;
+pub const GET_NOTIF_SIZES = 3;
+
+/// Bitflags for the SET_MODE_FILTER operation.
+pub const FILTER_FLAG = struct {
+    pub const TSYNC = 1 << 0;
+    pub const LOG = 1 << 1;
+    pub const SPEC_ALLOW = 1 << 2;
+    pub const NEW_LISTENER = 1 << 3;
+    pub const TSYNC_ESRCH = 1 << 4;
+};
+
+/// Action values for seccomp BPF programs.
+/// The lower 16-bits are for optional return data.
+/// The upper 16-bits are ordered from least permissive values to most.
+pub const RET = struct {
+    /// Kill the process.
+    pub const KILL_PROCESS = 0x80000000;
+    /// Kill the thread.
+    pub const KILL_THREAD = 0x00000000;
+    pub const KILL = KILL_THREAD;
+    /// Disallow and force a SIGSYS.
+    pub const TRAP = 0x00030000;
+    /// Return an errno.
+    pub const ERRNO = 0x00050000;
+    /// Forward the syscall to a userspace supervisor to make a decision.
+    pub const USER_NOTIF = 0x7fc00000;
+    /// Pass to a tracer or disallow.
+    pub const TRACE = 0x7ff00000;
+    /// Allow after logging.
+    pub const LOG = 0x7ffc0000;
+    /// Allow.
+    pub const ALLOW = 0x7fff0000;
+
+    // Masks for the return value sections.
+    pub const ACTION_FULL = 0xffff0000;
+    pub const ACTION = 0x7fff0000;
+    pub const DATA = 0x0000ffff;
+};
+
+pub const IOCTL_NOTIF = struct {
+    pub const RECV = IOCTL.IOWR('!', 0, notif);
+    pub const SEND = IOCTL.IOWR('!', 1, notif_resp);
+    pub const ID_VALID = IOCTL.IOW('!', 2, u64);
+    pub const ADDFD = IOCTL.IOW('!', 3, notif_addfd);
+};
+
+/// Tells the kernel that the supervisor allows the syscall to continue.
+pub const USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE = 1 << 0;
+
+/// See seccomp_unotify(2).
+pub const ADDFD_FLAG = struct {
+    pub const SETFD = 1 << 0;
+    pub const SEND = 1 << 1;
+};
+
+pub const data = extern struct {
+    /// The system call number.
+    nr: c_int,
+    /// The CPU architecture/system call convention.
+    /// One of the values defined in `std.os.linux.AUDIT`.
+    arch: u32,
+    instruction_pointer: u64,
+    arg0: u64,
+    arg1: u64,
+    arg2: u64,
+    arg3: u64,
+    arg4: u64,
+    arg5: u64,
+};
+
+/// Used with the ::GET_NOTIF_SIZES command to check if the kernel structures
+/// have changed.
+pub const notif_sizes = extern struct {
+    /// Size of ::notif.
+    notif: u16,
+    /// Size of ::resp.
+    notif_resp: u16,
+    /// Size of ::data.
+    data: u16,
+};
+
+pub const notif = extern struct {
+    /// Unique notification cookie for each filter.
+    id: u64,
+    /// ID of the thread that triggered the notification.
+    pid: u32,
+    /// Bitmask for event information. Currently set to zero.
+    flags: u32,
+    /// The current system call data.
+    data: data,
+};
+
+/// The decision payload the supervisor process sends to the kernel.
+pub const notif_resp = extern struct {
+    /// The filter cookie.
+    id: u64,
+    /// The return value for a spoofed syscall.
+    val: i64,
+    /// Set to zero for a spoofed success or a negative error number for a
+    /// failure.
+    @"error": i32,
+    /// Bitmask containing the decision. Either USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE to
+    /// allow the syscall or zero to spoof the return values.
+    flags: u32,
+};
+
+pub const notif_addfd = extern struct {
+    id: u64,
+    flags: u32,
+    srcfd: u32,
+    newfd: u32,
+    newfd_flags: u32,
+};