Convert asserts to errors, make sure nothing overflows

This commit is contained in:
Rocknest 2020-09-13 22:39:54 +03:00
parent a6d947191e
commit b6385870d0

View File

@ -5,15 +5,8 @@
// and substantial portions of the software.
const std = @import("std");
const crypto = std.crypto;
const debug = std.debug;
const assert = debug.assert;
const mem = std.mem;
// Exports
comptime {
_ = crypto.kdf.pbkdf2;
}
const maxInt = std.math.maxInt;
// RFC 2898 Section 5.2
//
@ -48,8 +41,8 @@ comptime {
/// PBKDF2 is defined in RFC 2898, and is a recommendation of NIST SP 800-132.
///
/// derivedKey: Slice of appropriate size for generated key. Generally 16 or 32 bytes in length.
/// May be uninitialized. All bytes will be written.
/// Maximum size is (2^32 - 1) * Hash.digest_length
/// May be uninitialized. All bytes will be overwritten.
/// Maximum size is `maxInt(u32) * Hash.digest_length`
/// It is a programming error to pass buffer longer than the maximum size.
///
/// password: Arbitrary sequence of bytes of any length, including empty.
@ -60,29 +53,41 @@ comptime {
/// Larger iteration counts improve security by increasing the time required to compute
/// the derivedKey. It is common to tune this parameter to achieve approximately 100ms.
///
/// Prf: Pseudo-random function to use. A common choice is std.crypto.auth.hmac.HmacSha256.
pub fn pbkdf2(derivedKey: []u8, password: []const u8, salt: []const u8, rounds: u32, comptime Prf: type) void {
assert(rounds >= 1);
/// Prf: Pseudo-random function to use. A common choice is `std.crypto.auth.hmac.HmacSha256`.
pub fn pbkdf2(derivedKey: []u8, password: []const u8, salt: []const u8, rounds: u32, comptime Prf: type) !void {
if (rounds < 1) return error.TooFewRounds;
const dkLen: u64 = derivedKey.len;
const hLen: u32 = Prf.mac_length; // Force type to ensure multiplications can't overflow
const dkLen = derivedKey.len;
const hLen = Prf.mac_length;
// FromSpec:
//
// 1. If dkLen > (2^32 - 1) * hLen, output "derived key too long" and
// 1. If dkLen > maxInt(u32) * hLen, output "derived key too long" and
// stop.
//
assert(dkLen > 0 and dkLen <= @as(u64, 1 << 32 - 1) * hLen);
if (comptime (maxInt(usize) < maxInt(u32) * hLen) and (dkLen > @as(usize, maxInt(u32) * hLen))) {
// If maxInt(usize) is less than `maxInt(u32) * hLen` then dkLen is always inbounds
// This also asserts hLen >= 1
return error.DerivedKeyTooLong;
}
// FromSpec:
//
// 2. Let l be the number of hLen-octet blocks in the derived key,
// rounding up, and let r be the number of octets in the last
// 2. Let l be the number of hLen-long blocks of bytes in the derived key,
// rounding up, and let r be the number of bytes in the last
// block
//
const l = (dkLen + hLen - 1) / hLen;
var r = dkLen % hLen;
r = if (r != 0) r else hLen;
// l will not overflow, proof:
// let `L(dkLen, hLen) = (dkLen + hLen - 1) / hLen`
// then `L^-1(l, hLen) = l*hLen - hLen + 1`
// 1) L^-1(maxInt(u32), hLen) <= maxInt(u32)*hLen
// 2) maxInt(u32)*hLen - hLen + 1 <= maxInt(u32)*hLen // subtract maxInt(u32)*hLen + 1
// 3) -hLen <= -1 // multiply by -1
// 4) hLen >= 1
const r_ = dkLen % hLen;
const l = @intCast(u32, (dkLen / hLen) + if (r_ == 0) 0 else 1); // original: (dkLen + hLen - 1) / hLen
const r = if (r_ == 0) hLen else r_;
// FromSpec:
//
@ -116,7 +121,6 @@ pub fn pbkdf2(derivedKey: []u8, password: []const u8, salt: []const u8, rounds:
// produce a derived key DK:
//
// DK = T_1 || T_2 || ... || T_l<0..r-1>
var block: u32 = 0; // Spec limits to u32
while (block < l) : (block += 1) {
var prevBlock: [hLen]u8 = undefined;
@ -130,9 +134,9 @@ pub fn pbkdf2(derivedKey: []u8, password: []const u8, salt: []const u8, rounds:
ctx.final(prevBlock[0..]);
// Choose portion of DK to write into (T_n) and initialize
const offset: usize = @as(usize, block) * hLen;
const offset = block * hLen;
const blockLen = if (block != l - 1) hLen else r;
var dkBlock = derivedKey[offset..(offset + blockLen)];
const dkBlock: []u8 = derivedKey[offset..][0..blockLen];
mem.copy(u8, dkBlock, prevBlock[0..dkBlock.len]);
var i: u32 = 1;
@ -150,6 +154,7 @@ pub fn pbkdf2(derivedKey: []u8, password: []const u8, salt: []const u8, rounds:
}
const htest = @import("test.zig");
const HmacSha1 = std.crypto.auth.hmac.HmacSha1;
// RFC 6070 PBKDF2 HMAC-SHA1 Test Vectors
test "RFC 6070 one iteration" {
@ -160,7 +165,7 @@ test "RFC 6070 one iteration" {
var derivedKey: [dkLen]u8 = undefined;
pbkdf2(&derivedKey, p, s, c, crypto.auth.hmac.HmacSha1);
try pbkdf2(&derivedKey, p, s, c, HmacSha1);
const expected = "0c60c80f961f0e71f3a9b524af6012062fe037a6";
@ -175,7 +180,7 @@ test "RFC 6070 two iterations" {
var derivedKey: [dkLen]u8 = undefined;
pbkdf2(&derivedKey, p, s, c, crypto.auth.hmac.HmacSha1);
try pbkdf2(&derivedKey, p, s, c, HmacSha1);
const expected = "ea6c014dc72d6f8ccd1ed92ace1d41f0d8de8957";
@ -190,7 +195,7 @@ test "RFC 6070 4096 iterations" {
var derivedKey: [dkLen]u8 = undefined;
pbkdf2(&derivedKey, p, s, c, crypto.auth.hmac.HmacSha1);
try pbkdf2(&derivedKey, p, s, c, HmacSha1);
const expected = "4b007901b765489abead49d926f721d065a429c1";
@ -210,7 +215,7 @@ test "RFC 6070 16,777,216 iterations" {
var derivedKey = [_]u8{0} ** dkLen;
pbkdf2(&derivedKey, p, s, c, crypto.auth.hmac.HmacSha1);
try pbkdf2(&derivedKey, p, s, c, HmacSha1);
const expected = "eefe3d61cd4da4e4e9945b3d6ba2158c2634e984";
@ -225,7 +230,7 @@ test "RFC 6070 multi-block salt and password" {
var derivedKey: [dkLen]u8 = undefined;
pbkdf2(&derivedKey, p, s, c, crypto.auth.hmac.HmacSha1);
try pbkdf2(&derivedKey, p, s, c, HmacSha1);
const expected = "3d2eec4fe41c849b80c8d83662c0e44a8b291a964cf2f07038";
@ -240,7 +245,7 @@ test "RFC 6070 embedded NUL" {
var derivedKey: [dkLen]u8 = undefined;
pbkdf2(&derivedKey, p, s, c, crypto.auth.hmac.HmacSha1);
try pbkdf2(&derivedKey, p, s, c, );
const expected = "56fa6aa75548099dcc37d7f03425e0c3";
@ -262,6 +267,6 @@ test "Very large dkLen" {
std.testing.allocator.free(derivedKey);
}
pbkdf2(derivedKey, p, s, c, crypto.auth.hmac.HmacSha1);
try pbkdf2(derivedKey, p, s, c, HmacSha1);
// Just verify this doesn't crash with an overflow
}